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Modeling Electricity
Auctions
The recent debates over discriminatory versus
uniform-price auctions in the UK and elsewhere
have revealed an incomplete understanding of the
limitations of some popular auction models when
applied to real-world electricity markets. This has
led certain regulatory authorities to prefer
discriminatory auctions on the basis of reasoning
from models which are not directly applicable to
any existing electricity market. Vickrey auctions,
although often recommended by economists, have
also been ignored in these debates. This article
describes the approach which we believe should be
taken to analyzing these issues.
Natalia Fabra, Nils-Henrik von der Fehr
and David Harbord *
I. Introduction
Electricity wholesale markets differ in numerous
dimensions, but until recently all have been
organized as uniform first-price auctions. Recent
experience - and the perceived poor performance -
of some decentralized electricity markets however,
has led certain regulatory authorities to consider
adopting new auction designs. In England and
Wales a major overhaul of the electricity trading
arrangements introduced in 1990 has recently taken
place, and amongst the reforms implemented in
March 2001, a discriminatory or “pay-as-bid”'
auction format has been adopted. The British
regulatory authorities believed that uniform
auctions are more subject to strategic manipulation
by large traders than are discriminatory auctions,
and expected the new market design to yield
                                               
*  Natalia Fabra is Marie Curie Research Fellow at IDEI,
University of Toulouse (fabra@cict.fr). Nils-Henrik von der
Fehr is Professor of Economics at the University of Oslo
(nhvd.fehr@econ.uio.no). David Harbord is Director of
Market Analysis Ltd, Oxford (manalysis@aol.com).
substantial reductions in wholesale electricity
prices.1
Similarly, the California Power Exchange recently
commissioned a report by leading auction theorists
on the advisability of a switch to a discriminatory
auction format for the Exhange's day ahead market,
due to the increasing incidence of price spikes in
both on and off peak periods. Again the suggestion
was that a discriminatory auction might curtail the
abuses of market power to which the market had
evidently been subject.2
It is well-known amongst auction theorists that
discriminatory auctions are not generally superior to
uniform auctions. Both types of auction are
commonly used in financial and other markets, and
there is now a voluminous economic literature
devoted to their study.3 In multi-unit settings the
comparison between these two auction forms is
particularly complex. Neither theory nor empirical
evidence tell us that discriminatory auctions
perform better than uniform auctions in markets
such as those for electricity, although this has now
become controversial.
Wolfram4 for instance, has argued in favor of
uniform auctions for electricity, and Rassenti, Smith
and Wilson5 cite experimental evidence which
suggests that discriminatory auctions may reduce
volatility (i.e. price spikes), but at the expense of
higher average prices. Other authors have come to
opposite conclusions. Federico and Rahman6 find
theoretical evidence in favor of discriminatory
auctions, at least for the polar cases of perfect
competition and monopoly, while Klemperer7
suggests that discriminatory auctions might be less
subject to ‘implicit collusion’. Kahn, Cramton,
Porter and Tabors,8 on the other hand, reject
outright the idea that switching to a discriminatory
auction will result in greater competition or lower
prices.
While the debate in the UK and California has been
focused on the advantages or disadvantages of
uniform versus discriminatory auctions, amongst
economists Vickrey auctions are often favored.
Vickrey auctions make ‘truthful’ bidding, e.g.
Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord:  Modeling Electricity Auctions
June 2002 2
bidding at marginal cost, a weakly dominant
strategy for firms, and hence result in least cost
production, or dispatch efficiency. This comes at a
cost, since firms with market power need to be paid
the opportunity costs of their bids, and these
payments can be large.9 Vickrey auctions in
markets such as those for electricity have to date
received relatively little detailed analysis
however.10
In a recent paper we addressed this electricity
auction design issue in a series of models which
represent some of the key features of decentralized
electricity markets, albeit within a simplified
framework.11 We characterized equilibrium market
outcomes in a discrete, multi-unit auction model for
uniform, discriminatory and Vickrey electricity
auctions under a variety of assumptions concerning
firms’ costs and capacities, demand elasticities, the
auction bid format and the number of suppliers in
the market. Our purpose was to gain an improved
understanding of how these different auction
formats affect suppliers’ bidding behavior, the
degree of competition and overall welfare in
decentralized electricity markets.
Not surprisingly, we found that the welfare ranking
of the auction types is inherently ambiguous. If the
regulator is solely concerned with productive
efficiency then the Vickrey auction should always
be chosen, as it guarantees efficiency independently
of industry and market data. If, on the other hand,
the regulator is solely concerned with the
maximization of consumer surplus, then a uniform
auction should probably never be chosen, as it is
typically outperformed by the discriminatory
auction, and in some cases by the Vickrey auction.
For more general regulatory preferences the ranking
is uncertain.12 For some specifications of demand,
costs, and firms' capacities the discriminatory
auction dominates the uniform auction on both
efficiency and consumer surplus criteria. In other
scenarios the reverse ranking can be shown to
(weakly) hold. Hence if the regulator is restricted to
a choice between discriminatory and uniform
auctions, this should be viewed as an empirical
question that depends upon the nature of demand,
market structure and the relative efficiencies of
firms. Our analysis provides no support, however,
for the presumption of some regulatory authorities
that by changing the auction format from uniform to
discriminatory a significant improvement in market
performance can be achieved.
The purpose of this article is not to describe this
equilibrium analysis in any detail. Rather we wish
to explain our choice of models, for this has also
recently become controversial, and it is critically
important to policy discussions. Indeed, some
regulatory authorities appear to have come to prefer
discriminatory over uniform-price auctions on the
basis of reasoning from auction models that are not
directly applicable to any existing electricity
market. We also discuss some of the pros and cons
of using Vickrey auctions, which in our view have
received too little attention in recent debates.
II. Modeling Electricity Auctions
As auction theorist Paul Klemperer has recently
noted, although it was not initially well-understood
that deregulated electricity markets are best
described and analyzed as auctions, this is now
uncontroversial. With the exception of the new
discriminatory auction format adopted in England
and Wales, all electricity markets created to date
have been organized as first-price, multi-unit
auctions. Competition in these markets occurs by
suppliers submitting bids which specify the
minimum prices at which they are willing to supply
energy, and the amount of capacity available at each
price. On the basis of these bids an industry supply
curve is constructed, which together with a forecast
of demand determines which generating units will
be dispatched in any particular period. In uniform,
or first-price, electricity auctions, market prices are
determined by the bid price of the marginal
accepted unit. In discriminatory auctions, such as
the England and Wales balancing market, suppliers
are paid their bids, while consumers pay a
(weighted) average of the accepted bids.
Within this general framework there is huge
variation in auction designs, most of which can be
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safely ignored for our current purposes. Three
features of electricity auctions are crucial to any
analysis however. First, all electricity auctions limit
the number of bids that may be submitted by any
supplier to a small number. For example, in the
original market design in England and Wales
generators were permitted only three incremental
bid prices per unit of capacity, while in the Spanish
electricity market generators may submit up to
twenty-five price-quantity pairs. This means that all
electricity auctions are discrete multi-unit auctions
rather than continuous “share auctions” or auctions
for perfectly divisible goods. This distinction is
important because the analysis of auctions with
discrete (i.e. step) bid functions differs in significant
ways from that for auctions with continuous supply
or demand schedules. We expand on this point
immediately below.
Secondly, electricity auctions differ in the duration
of suppliers' bids. In Australia and Argentina (and
in the original UK market), generator bids are
“long-lived” so a single step-bid function remains
valid for an extended period during which demand
varies.13 In contrast, in the Spanish, Nordic and
(now defunct) California markets, bids are “short-
lived”, and last for a single market period only. In
Australia and Argentina, although the value of
demand in any period may be known with a high
degree of certainty, suppliers' bids are constant over
numerous periods during which demand fluctuates.
Thus from the point of view of bidders, demand
may be viewed as being either stochastic or
variable.14 Conversely, when bids are short-lived,
demand in any period will be known with certainty,
i.e. fixed, before bids are submitted.
Finally, suppliers in electricity markets operate
under binding capacity constraints, which means
that in many periods there will be no excess supply
when the capacity of a single firm is taken out of
the system. While much has been made of this fact
in recent regulatory inquiries and policy
discussions, it has been ignored in some theoretical
discussions, despite its strong implications for the
analysis of equilibria in any auction format.
These three characteristics of electricity auctions
have been important in determining our choice of
models, and they are also key to understanding the
related literature. Most analyses of electricity
auctions to date have adopted one of two possible
modeling approaches: the continuous “share
auction” or “supply function” approach pioneered
by Wilson, Back and Zender and Klemperer and
Meyer, and applied to the British electricity market
by Green and Newbery (1992),15 or the discrete,
multi-unit auction approach, first applied to
electricity markets by von der Fehr and Harbord
(1993).16 The predictions of these models differ
significantly however, and where they do careful
interpretation of the results is required. In the
remainder of this article we discuss the comparison
of uniform and discriminatory auctions based on
these (and related) modeling approaches, and then
discuss the much less extensive literature on
Vickrey electricity auctions.
III. Uniform or Discriminatory?
A. Markets with short-lived bids
For electricity auctions with short-lived bids, to a
first approximation, demand in each period will be
known with certainty by all market participants
before bids are submitted. Hence these markets are
best analyzed as auctions with fixed, or
deterministic, demand. As noted by Klemperer,17 if
such markets are treated as auctions for “infinitely-
divisible quantities of homogeneous units,” then
even in the absence of binding capacity constraints,
“collusive-like” equilibria can arise, resulting in
very high profits and prices. Such outcomes can be
supported in a uniform auction because firms are
concerned with only a single point on their
(continuous) supply curves, the point corresponding
to the market-clearing price, and the rest of the
supply curve can be used to inhibit competition
from the other suppliers.
For example, if a supplier submits a very steep
supply curve, the residual demand curve facing his
rivals will also be steep. A steep residual demand
curve implies that the opportunity cost of capturing
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an increment in supply beyond the supplier's
collusive allocation is high. In this way artificially
high prices can be supported in equilibrium. These
strategies are costless in a uniform auction because
the low inframarginal bids used to support the
equilibria are payoff-irrelevant, and never received
by the  bidder.18
In a discriminatory auction, on the other hand, any
price bid below the market-clearing price will be
paid to the bidder. This means that a supplier will
care about its entire supply curve, rather than just a
single point on it, effectively restricting the set of
strategies that may be played in equilibrium. In the
absence of pay-off irrelevant bids, the “collusive-
like” equilibria of the uniform auction cannot be
implemented.
Klemperer (2001) has recently suggested that the
collusive equilibria of the continuous uniform
auction are one reason that the regulatory
authorities in Britain decided to adopt a
discriminatory auction format:
“Uniform-price auctions are more vulnerable
than...discriminatory auctions to collusion.... In a
uniform-price auction ... bidders can tacitly agree
to divide up the market at a very favorable price for
themselves by each bidding extremely aggressively
for smaller quantities than its collusive share, thus
deterring other bidders from bidding for
more....The U.K. electricity regulator believes this
market has fallen prey to exactly this kind of
implicit collusion. ...By contrast, implicit collusion
is harder in a discriminatory auction. Partly for this
reason the U.K. regulator has proposed a set of
New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) that
will replace the uniform-price auction by an
exchange market followed by a discriminatory
auction....''
Electricity auctions are not continuous share
auctions however, and the equilibrium outcomes of
the continuous model differ significantly from those
of the discrete, multi-unit model. In particular,
where the uniform auction with continuous bid
functions yields a continuum of pure-strategy
equilibria, some of which are “collusive” in the
sense described above, the discrete multi-unit
auction model predicts a unique, Bertrand-like
equilibrium. This is because in the continuous
auction, as noted, suppliers can bid in very steep
supply functions which eliminate a rival’s incentive
to bid more aggressively.19 Discreteness in the bid
functions rules this out however. When suppliers
are limited to a finite number of price-quantity bids,
a positive increment in output can always be
obtained by just slightly undercutting the price of a
rival's unit. Since this ‘quantity effect’ outweighs
the ‘price effect’, the collusive-like equilibria found
in the continuous auction cannot be implemented.
Because this remains true in the limit, as we allow
the bid-step size to become infinitesimal, it cannot
even be argued that the continuous share auction
model is a valid approximation to the discrete
model for small enough bid-steps. This means that
the collusive-like equilibria of the share auction
model are probably irrelevant for policy
prescription in electricity markets, and should not
be used to diagnose competition problems. They are
derived from an auction model which simply does
not apply.
This point was first alluded to in von der Fehr and
Harbord (1993), and has now been made
independently, and particularly clearly, by
Nyborg.20 He shows that the collusive equilibria of
the Wilson and Back and Zender models are
eliminated when bidders can only make a finite
number of bids (or there is a quantity multiple), and
instead Bertrand-like price competition is induced.21
Indeed, Nyborg suggests that this may explain the
prevalence of uniform auctions, despite the
theoretical warnings of severe underpricing, as well
as the ambiguous conclusions reached by the US
Treasury experiments.22
B. Markets with long-lived bids
When suppliers' bids are long-lived, i.e. stay
constant over many separate market periods, then
demand is best treated as being variable, or
uncertain, from a supplier's point of view, rather
than fixed and known with certainty at the time bids
are submitted. The relevant version of the
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continuous auction is then Klemperer and Meyer's
(1989) “supply function” equilibrium model.23 The
addition of demand variability or uncertainty can
reduce the set of equilibria in the auction
significantly, since there are fewer payoff-irrelevant
bids that can be used to support “collusive-like”
equilibria.24 As shown by Klemperer and Meyer
(1989), equilibria in the supply function model will
typically lie between the perfectly competitive and
Cournot market outcomes.
The reduction in the number of equilibria in the
continuous model also reduces the extent to which
the continuous and discrete multi-unit auction
models disagree. Nevertheless the two models still
diverge in significant ways. In the first place, where
the supply function model yields a continuum of
pure-strategy equilibria, some of which involve
prices well above marginal costs of any firm, the
discrete multi-unit model again predicts a unique
Bertrand-like market outcome.25  And secondly, in
the discrete multi-unit auction with capacity
constraints, there will frequently be no pure strategy
equilibria at all.26 The models thus differ both in
their description of equilibrium bidding behavior,
and in the predicted market outcomes. Again, since
the equilibria of the discrete model do not converge
to the equilibria of the continuous supply function
model as we let the size of the bid-step become
small, use of the supply function model cannot be
justified by arguing that it approximates the discrete
multi-unit model in the limit.
C. Comment
Equilibrium predictions of continuous share
auction, or supply function, models differ
significantly from those derived from discrete
multi-unit models. Since in all electricity auctions
suppliers are limited to a small (i.e. finite) number
of bids, this means that the results from the supply
function approach must be treated with considerable
care, and may frequently be inapplicable. This fact
has not received the recognition it deserves in the
existing literature, and is especially important when
evaluating the efficiency of different auction
formats.
Careful theoretical work and experiments have so
far yielded no strong reasons for preferring
discriminatory to uniform price auctions for
electricity. Application of the continuous supply
function model may well have led the British
regulatory authorities astray on this issue however,
and at considerable potential cost in terms of
regulatory resources and market performance.
 D. Other literature
Kahn, Cramton, Porter and Tabors have also
compared uniform and discriminatory auctions for
electricity, based on results from the general auction
literature.27 In their report for the California Power
Exchange (see Kahn et al., 2001) they concluded
that the proposed shift from a uniform to a
discriminatory auction was ill-advised, and unlikely
to result in lower electricity prices. In particular:
“The immediate consequence would be a radical
change in bidding behavior that would: (i) forestall
the anticipated savings; (ii) introduce
unmeasurable inefficiencies in the dispatch of
power and impose new costs on generating
companies, which would inevitably tend to increase
rather than decrease average prices; (iii) tend to
weaken the competition in generation ...; and (iv)
impede...the expansion of capacity that, along with
intensified demand-side response, is the only
fundamental remedy for the recent poor
performance of electricity markets in California.”
Kahn et al. (2001) argued that in a competitive
electricity market, in a uniform auction, each
generating company would have strong incentives
to bid at marginal (avoidable) cost, hence ensuring
both productive and allocative efficiency. In a
discriminatory auction, on the other hand, although
this may theoretically still be the case, bidders'
attempts to predict the marginal accepted bid will
inevitably lead to forecasting errors and hence to
dispatch inefficiency, as well as to inefficient
investments in market forecasting. They also
argued, based on results from Maskin and Riley,28
that:
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“Inefficiencies will not be a consequence only of
forecasting errors if bidders differ substantially and
consistently in their relative marginal costs. In that
case, occasional inefficient outcomes are a
consequence of rational strategic bidding. For
example, if there are two bidders with uncertain
costs...and one is known to have lower costs than
the other on average, the bidder likely to have
higher costs will rationally bid less
aggressively...than the bidder with lower costs....
The consequence will be that the disadvantaged
bidder will be called on to supply too often, because
it will have submitted a lower bid in some instances
in which it has higher costs than its more efficient
rival.''
Since Kahn et al (2000) do not specify a model it is
difficult to evaluate all of their claims. In particular,
it is not always made clear what is meant by a
“competitive electricity market”.29  The argument
taken from Maskin and Riley (2000) is slightly
easier to place in context however. Maskin and
Riley show that in a single-unit auction with two
bidders and cost or valuation asymmetries, in a
discriminatory auction low-valuation types might
be induced to bid more aggressively than high-
valuation types, and hence win the auction even
when it is inefficient for them to do so.
Nevertheless, the discriminatory auction still yields
higher (expected) revenues for the seller - or lower
prices for the buyer in a procurement auction - and
so might be preferred to the uniform auction on
those grounds. This is somewhat similar in spirit to
our demonstration that the discriminatory auction
may result in higher-cost firms producing too often
when mixed strategies are played, but yield lower
average prices than the uniform auction.30
Maskin and Riley's result, however, comes from a
single-unit auction with two competing buyers, in
which the source of the inefficiency is incomplete
information concerning the buyers’ valuations. Our
result, on the other hand, comes from a multi-unit
auction model in which information is complete and
the source of the suppliers' market power is a tight
demand/capacity balance. The Maskin and Riley
result might be viewed as providing an efficiency
rationale for preferring the uniform to the
discriminatory auction even in the absence of
capacity constraints, given the right kind of cost
asymmetries and incomplete information. However
if the discriminatory auction results in lower
expected prices, the welfare ranking of the two
auctions will remain ambiguous. Indeed, the
Vickrey auction would appear to dominate the two
other auction formats in this setting, which leads us
to our final topic in this paper.
V. Vickrey Electricity Auctions
Although much recommended by economists,
Vickrey auctions have rarely been applied in
practice, at least in multi-unit settings.31 The
fundamental insight of Vickrey32 was that by
making the price received by a bidder independent
of its own offer price, marginal cost bidding can be
induced as a weakly dominant strategy. von der
Fehr and Harbord (1993) considered a version of a
Vickrey auction in which each supplier is paid a
price for each unit accepted by the auctioneer
determined by the intersection of the demand curve
with the ‘residual’ supply curve obtained by
subtracting the higher-priced units of that supplier.
A supplier can then influence its own payoff only to
the extent that its bids affect the probability of being
dispatched. Since a supplier will prefer to be
operating for all realizations of demand when its
payoff is positive, and will prefer not to operate
whenever its payoff is negative, offering to supply
at a price equal to marginal cost becomes a weakly
dominant strategy.
An important feature of Vickrey auctions for
electricity is that there may not exist any excess
supply when we remove units of a given supplier,
i.e. the intersection of the residual supply curve
with the demand curve may be empty. When this
occurs a “reserve price” must be defined. If demand
is perfectly inelastic, the reserve price is given by
consumers' common maximum willingness to pay.
For downward sloping demand curves, the reserve
price is the point on the demand curve
corresponding to consumers’ marginal willingness
to pay for that unit. This is a simple version of the
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Vickrey auctions with reserve pricing considered by
Ausubel and Cramton (1999).
Krishna and Tranaes (1999) and Hobbs, Rothkopf
and Hyde33 have analyzed Clark-Groves-Vickrey
mechanisms for electricity markets in which each
supplier is paid it's own bid for each unit of capacity
accepted, plus the improvement in social welfare
that results from its bid (i.e. the cost savings to the
auctioneer). This formulation is essentially
equivalent to the multi-unit Vickrey auction.
However in both of these analyses it is assumed that
there is always sufficient excess supply, when the
capacity of single supplier is removed from the
system, to define this cost saving from the rejected
bids of the other suppliers. Hence neither paper
considers what happens when bidders are large and
reserve pricing is required.34
The key difficulty with a Vickrey auction, with or
without reserve pricing, is that the auctioneer's
revenues and payments will typically not balance,
i.e. the auctioneer will run a deficit.35 This feature
of the Vickrey auction is well-known, and a general
characteristic of optimal incentive-compatible
revelation mechanisms. In order to induce the
truthful revelation of private information, agents
must be offered a positive informational rent.
Payment of this rent must come from alternative
(non-distorting) sources if the efficiency of the
market allocation is to be maintained. When
demand is price-inelastic this problem is easily
solved, as the market price can include a mark-up to
cover informational rents without distorting
efficiency. With downward sloping demand on the
other hand, non-distorting payments from other
sources, e.g. lump-sum taxes levied on market
participants, may be required.
Another problem with a Vickrey auction (c.f.
Hobbs et al., 2000) is that, like the discriminatory
auction, it does not define a market-clearing price,
and such a price may be required to reconcile
deviations from agreed upon forward transactions.36
Determining a price for such purposes has proved
both difficult, and controversial, for the UK
regulatory authorities.37
VI. Conclusion
The recent regulatory debates over discriminatory
versus uniform-price auctions in the UK, California
and elsewhere have revealed an incomplete
understanding of the limitations of some popular
auction models when applied to real-world
electricity markets. Arguments in favor of
discriminatory auctions appear to come largely
from analyses of share auction or supply function
models, which are of dubious relevance to any
existing electricity market, for the reasons described
in this article. Although Vickrey auctions are
frequently recommended by economists, they have
been largely ignored in these debates, and subject to
too little analysis.
This paper has described the approach that we
believe should be taken to analyzing these issues. In
Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord (2002) we used a
discrete, multi-unit auction model to compare
uniform, discriminatory and Vickrey auctions for
electricity under a variety of assumptions. We
found that the welfare ranking of the different
auctions is inherently ambiguous. An understanding
of the shortcomings of continuous auction models
for diagnosing competition problems in real-world
electricity markets may help to prevent expensive
reform processes from being undertaken in future
which hold out little prospect of real improvements
in market performance.
Endnotes:
                                               
1 See Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), The New
Electricity Trading Arrangements, Volume 1, Birmingham,
1999. David Harbord and Chris McCoy, Mis-Designing the
Electricity Market, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW REVIEW,
2000, at 258-260, discuss the auction reforms in England and
Wales, and are critical of the reasoning of the UK regulatory
authorities. Ofgem, The New Electricity Trading
Arrangements: A Review of the First Three Months,
Birmingham, 2001, nevertheless claims that its objectives have
been achieved. Frontier Economics, Random Wobbles in the
Balancing Mechanism? An Assessment of NETA in Action,”
August, 2001, takes a different view of the evidence.
2  See Alfred Kahn,  Peter Cramton, Robert Porter and Richard
Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord:  Modeling Electricity Auctions
June 2002 8
                                                                               
Tabors, Uniform Pricing or Pay-As-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma
for California and Beyond, ELECTRICITY JOURNAL, 2001, at
70-79, and Stephen Rassenti,  Vernon Smith and Bart Wilson,
Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets: Low
Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels, DEPT. OF
ECONOMICS, UNIV. OF ARIZONA, 2001, for discussions.
3 See Larry Ausubel and Peter Cramton, Demand Reduction
and Inefficiency in Multi-unit Auctions, DEPT. OF
ECONOMICS, UNIV. OF MARYLAND, 1998, and Ken
Binmore and Joe Swierzbinski, Treasury Auctions: Uniform
or Discriminatory?, REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN, Vol. 5,
2000, at 387-410, for the theory and empirical evidence.
4 Catherine Wolfram, Electricity Markets: Should the Rest of
the World Adopt the UK Reforms?, REGULATION, 1999, Vol.
22, at 48-53.
5 Rassenti,  Smith and Wilson, op. cit.
6 Guilo Federico and David Rahman Bidding in an Electricity
Pay-As-Bid Auction, Working  paper No. 2001 W5, NUFFIELD
COLLEGE, OXFORD, 2001.
7 Paul Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design,
mimeo, NUFFIELD COLLEGE, OXFORD, 2001.
8 Kahn,  Cramton, Porter and Tabors, op. cit.
9 See Robert Wilson, Architecture of Power Markets, GSB,
STANFORD UNIVERSITY, 2001, for a discussion.
10 Nils-Henrik von  der Fehr and David Harbord, Spot Market
Competition in the UK Electricity Industry, ECONOMIC
JOURNAL, Vol. 103, 1993, at 531-546, studied Vickrey
auctions with reserve prices in electricity markets for some
extremely simple cases. Ausubel and Cramton, op. cit. provide
a more general framework.
11 Natalia Fabra, Nils-Henrik von der Fehr and David
Harbord, Designing Electricity Auctions: Uniform,
Discriminatory and Vickrey, mimeo, IDEI and UNIVERSITY OF
OSLO, 2002. These simplifications allowed for direct
comparisons in many cases.
12 For example, a weighted average of consumer and producer
surplus.
13  In Australia, and in the original England and Wales market,
bids are submitted daily, while in Argentina bids last for six
months. See Anton García-Díaz and Pedro Marín, Strategic
Bidding in Electricity Pools with Short-lived Bids: An
Application to the Spanish Electricity Market, CEPR
Discussion Paper 2567, 2002, for the importance of this
distinction.
14 This observation was first made in Richard Green and
David Newbery, Competition in the British Electricity Spot
                                                                               
Market, JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1992, Vol. 100, at
929-53.
15 Robert Wilson, Auctions of Shares, QUARTERLY JOURNAL
OF ECONOMICS, 1979, Vol. 93, at 675-689, Kerry Back and
Jamie Zender, Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale
for the Treasury Experiment, THE REVIEW OF FINANCIAL
STUDIES, 1993, Vol. 6, No. 4, at 733-764, Paul Klemperer and
Margaret Meyer, Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly
Under Uncertainty, ECONOMETRICA, 1989, Vol. 57, at 1243-
1277, Green and Newbery (1992), op. cit.  See also Richard
Green, Increasing Competition in the British Electricity Spot
Market, JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 1996, vol.
XLIV, at 205-216, Federico and Rahman (2001), op. cit.,
Kalai Krishna and Torben Tranaes, Providing Uncertain
Quantities Efficiently: Theory and Applications to Electricity
Deregulation, mimeo, NBER, 1999, and Ross Baldick and
William Hogan, Capacity Constrained Supply Function
Equilibrium Models of Electricity Markets, PWP 089,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA ENERGY INSTITUTE, 2001.
16 See also García-Díaz and Marín (2002) op. cit., Anton
García-Díaz, Uniform-price Versus Pay Your Bid Multi-unit
Auctions Under Complete Information, mimeo, UNIVERSIDAD
CARLOS III, 2000, Natalia Fabra, Tacit Collusion in Repeated
Auctions: Uniform-price Versus Discriminatory, mimeo,
IDEI, UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE, 2002, Claude Crampes and
Anna Creti, Price Bids and Capacity Choice in Electricity
Markets, mimeo, IDEI, UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE, 2001, and
Gert Brunekreeft, A Multiple-unit, Multiple-period Auction in
the British Electricity Spot Market, ENERGY ECONOMICS,
2001, Vol. 23, at 99-118.
17 Paul Klemperer, Why Every Economist Should Learn Some
Auction Theory, mimeo, NUFFIELD COLLEGE, Oxford, 2000.
18 See Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Section 2, Kerry Back
and Jamie Zender, Auctions of Divisible Goods with
Endogenous Supply, Working Paper, UNIVERSITY OF
ARIZONA, 1999, and James Wang, and Jamie Zender,
Auctioning Divisible Goods, ECONOMIC THEORY, 2002, Vol.
19 (4), at 673-705 for further discussion.
19 Another way of saying this is that, faced with a rival's steep
supply function, the incentive to bid aggressively is offset by
the large decrease in price required to capture an infinitesimal
increment in output. The ‘price effect’ always outweighs the
‘quantity effect’ for units of infinitesimal size.
20 Kjell Nyborg, Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform
Price Auctions, mimeo, LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL, 2001.
21 For an analysis of auctions with both a quantity multiple and
a positive tick size, see  Nyborg (2001) op. cit., Section 4.2.
22 See Christine Archibald and Paul Malvey, Uniform-price
Auctions: Update of the Treasury Experience, Working Paper,
Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord:  Modeling Electricity Auctions
June 2002 9
                                                                               
U.S. TREASURY, 1998, and Gregory Belzer and Vincent
Reinhart, Some Evidence on Bid Sharing and the Use of
Information in the U.S. Treasury's Auction Experiment,
Working Paper, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM, 1996.
23 See Back and Zender (1993), op. cit., and Nyborg (2001),
op. cit., for further analysis of this model.
24 More formally, first-order conditions must now hold over an
entire interval of possible equilibrium prices, corresponding to
different realizations of demand, rather than just at a single
point, as in the non-stochastic model.  With unbounded
uncertainty Klemperer and Meyer (1989), op. cit. show that
equilibria in the supply function  model are unique.
25 See Nyborg (2001), op. cit., Sections 3 and 4, for an
exposition of this result.
26 See von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), op. cit., Proposition
4, and Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord (2002), op. cit.,
Section 6.
27 See also Wolfram (1999), op. cit.
28 Eric Maskin and John Riley, Asymmetric Auctions, REVIEW
OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2001, Vol. 67, at 413-438.
29 It is certainly not true in our models that in a competitive
framework each firm will bid in its own marginal cost in the
uniform auction. Indeed, the uniform and discriminatory
auctions are strategically equivalent in this setting.
30 Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord (2002), op. cit., Section
4.2.
31 See Michael Rothkopf, Thomas Teisberg and Edward Kahn,
Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare? JOURNAL OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY, 1990, Vol. 98(1), at 94-109, for a discussion.
Ascending (English) auctions, such as those used to sell
antiques and rare paintings, are of course equivalent to single-
unit Vickrey auctions, c.f. Binmore and Swierbinski (2000),
op. cit.
32 William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and
Competitive Sealed Tenders, THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Vol.
16, 1961, at 8-37.
33 Benjamin Hobbs, Michael Rothkopf, Laurel Hyde and
Richard O’Neill, Evaluation of a Truthful Revelation Auction
in the Context of Energy Markets with Nonconcave Benefits,
JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS, Vol. 18,
2000, at 5-32.
34 Krishna and Tranaes (1999), op. cit., assume continuous
supply functions, following Klemperer and Meyer (1989), op.
cit. Hobbs et al. (2000), op. cit., are not explicit on this point.
However the continuity assumption is of no importance when
considering Vickrey auctions.
                                                                               
35 Also noted by Hobbs et al. (2000), op. cit.
36 Peter Cramton and Robert Wilson, A Review of ISO New
England's Proposed Market Rules, mimeo, GSB, STANFORD
UNIVERSITY, 1998, emphasize the importance of this feature
of uniform-price electricity auctions.
37 See Harbord and McCoy (2000), op. cit., for a discussion. A
third much-discussed problem with Vickrey auctions, or
mechanisms, is their vulnerability to collusion, especially
between the sellers and buyers, c.f. Rothkopf et al. (1990), op.
cit. and Krishna and Tranaes (1999), op. cit.
